Unrestricted Warfare, by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui (Beijing: PLA Literature Note: The following selections are taken from "Unrestricted Warfare," a book. Unrestricted Warfare Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February ) Unrestricted Warfare, by Qiao Liang. Unrestricted Warfare is a book on military strategy written in by two colonels in the . Selections from Unrestricted Warfare · Modern warfare – the battle for public opinion resrastraknabest.ga Format - article (31 July ); Unrestricted Warfare.

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A sobering and fascinating study on war in the modern era, Unrestricted Warfare carefully explores strategies that militarily and politically disadvantaged nations. Force colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, published Unrestricted Warfare. This paper critically analyzes the concept of “Unrestricted Warfare” as it relates. Unrestricted Warfare is a book on military strategy written in by two colonels in the People's Liberation Army, Qiao Liang and Wang.

One of the better-known alternatives in this book is the idea of attacking networks. Networks are increasingly important in not only data exchange but also transportation, financial institutions, and communication.

Attacks that disable networks can easily hamstring large areas of life that are dependent on them for coordination. One example of network warfare would be shutting down a network that supplies power.

If there is a significant failure in the power grid caused by the attack, massive power outages could result, crippling industry, defense, medicine, and all other areas of life. Another instance of threats to nations within the scope of the concept of "unrestricted warfare" is terrorism.

Terrorism is used by a group to gain satisfaction for certain demands. Even if these demands are not satisfied, a terrorist attack can have vastly disproportionate effects on national welfare.

One only has to look at the economic crisis that followed the terrorist attacks against the United States, or the extensive security measures put in place after those same attacks. Terrorism erodes a nation's sense of security and well being, even if the direct effects of the attacks only concern a minute percentage of the population.

Open issues

The authors note that an old-fashioned mentality that considers military action the only offensive action is inadequate given the new range of threats. Instead, the authors advocate forming a "composite force in all aspects related to national interest.

Moreover, given this type of composite force, it is also necessary to have this type of composite force to become the means which can be utilized for actual operations. This should be a "grand warfare method" which combines all of the dimensions and methods in the two major areas of military and non-military affairs so as to carry out warfare. This is opposite of the formula for warfare methods brought forth in past wars.

As the authors state, the new range of options combined with the rising cost both political and financial of waging traditional warfare results in the rising dominance of the new alternatives to traditional military action.

A state that does not heed these warnings is in dire shape. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. United States Naval Institute. Jul Marine Corps Gazette. Feb Document types: Book Review-Favorable Source type: Retrieved from " https: Interlocking and competing Beijing-Delhi agendas meant that the government benefitted enormously when, in the s, India switched its allegiance and provision of military and political support from the Tigers to Colombo Senanayake, Similarly, China emerged as a key player in Sri Lankan politics in the final years of the war, when it proved itself a steadfast ally of Colombo in the UN Security Council SC and other fora Bhadrakumar, ; Harneis, Inhumanity in the Vanni and Hesitant Humanitarianism 13The inhumanity of the war in the Vanni — the steady slaughter of a besieged population held against its will in a diminishing strip of coastal shrub-land — was shocking.

Relief actors had worked with both sets of warring parties. Rajapakse had promised his Sinhala national alliance that he would crush the Tigers.

It focused on those displaced as a result of the war in the east, and made no reference to either increasing preparedness or potential changes in the Vanni humanitarian caseload CHAP, Colombo used visa and travel permits, the threat of expulsion from the country, character assassination and allegations of pro-Tiger sympathies to coerce and control the relief system.

Threats to staff safety, particularly national staff, were a valid concern. The aid community protested the killing of their colleagues, but did not seize the potential watershed moment to re-negotiate the space and parameters of humanitarian action.

As a result, as the fighting intensified, the manipulation of humanitarian action by both warring parties for their own strategic goals, on and off the battlefield, was a key factor in the intensification of suffering and death.

This arrangement meant that the warring parties were keen to dominate and exploit humanitarian programming as part of a wider struggle for leverage and legitimacy. In the final months of the armed conflict, the besieged population was used for strategic advantage by both sides.

In the process, each party also used aid convoys to shelter or camouflage their military movements, while vehemently denying doing so Weiss, As the war moved into its final stage, the LTTE leadership calculated, erroneously, that mass civilian deaths would oblige the international community to intervene and, in the process, provide some respite to its fighters. For all intents and purposes, this strategy was accepted by the diaspora, an important source of Tiger funding and support.

This allowed it to manipulate population movements and provoke an exodus from the Vanni Keen, The government greatly restricted the supply of essential medicines, but as it was eager to avoid provoking international concern, it allowed a small amount of food to get through Keen, Perennially on the defensive, the relief system further compromised its credibility, as well as its practical capacity to deliver on its responsibilities, when it failed to prioritise the safety and protection of those exposed to unrestricted warfare.

Prioritisation and Protection 22Colombo advised the UN on 3 September that it could not guarantee the safety of UN staff after several artillery shells hit Kilinochchi, a town the warring parties had agreed to respect as a conflict-free zone.


The departure of humanitarian agencies, with the exception of the International Committee of the Red Cross ICRC and Caritas, served only to compound the vulnerability of those in the Vanni. Instead, the statement merely reminded the warring parties of their obligations under international humanitarian law United Nations Secretary General Report [UNSG], Although, since the end of the Cold War, both individual organisations and the relief system have invested heavily in their capacity to address the protection issues in crisis settings, there was little evidence of this in Sri Lanka.

At the time, the relief system largely failed to acknowledge that the tactics and practices of unrestricted warfare designed to increase and exploit the suffering of those in the Vanni were matters that fell under the mandate of humanitarian agencies IRP, Issues concerning the physical safety of civilians were, nearly without exception, seen as too complicated to address. The relief system was aware of the political dynamics shaping the life-threatening crisis, but stuck to a response model with limited relevance to the policies and practices driving up the death toll.

There was, of course, a food shortage in the Vanni, but there was a much greater need to counter the unrestrained warfare and policies that restricted the availability of essentials such as anaesthetics, antibiotics and paediatric medicines HRW, The combination of policies, tactics, and narratives used to justify no-holds-barred warfare, however, coupled with the reluctance of the relief system to take a principled and assertive stance on the inhumanity of the war, makes Sri Lankan case unique.

Unrestricted Warfare Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui

Although the humanitarian community devised mechanisms to identify overall contextual objectives, and measures to evaluate the results, it did not similarly develop a unified protection strategy.

The CHAP made no reference to the protection problems inherent to the deepening crisis in the Vanni, the practice of indiscriminate warfare, the rising death toll, or the deliberate blockage of life-saving medicines. Others indicated that a narrow focus on maintaining a post-war presence and the provision of support for planned IDP camps deflected attention from protection issues.

In addition, as the conflict escalated, there was significant confusion as to what, precisely, protection might mean in the context of humanitarian action. Beijing, which habitually claims to oppose interference in the internal affairs of other states, used its Security Council seat to block UN action, despite the fact that this policy clearly favoured one side over the other.

They emphasised that the lack of support for the humanitarian imperative — the prioritisation of lifesaving over all other considerations — meant that there was limited value in challenging the inhumanity that drove the unfoldingcatastrophe.

Similarly, pushing for recognition of the protected status of civilians under international humanitarian law was not perceived as a practical or tangible contribution to the material measures needed to help the besieged survive the war. By mid, nearly the entire population of the Vanni was dependent upon the humanitarian system for their survival. In early , a UN official estimated that only 50 per centof the relief goods required had been provided during the previous year Keen, Accommodating Atrocity 32A critical feature of the end phase of the hostilities was the use of the besieged population by both parties to advance their war aims.

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Many civilians in the Vanni were fearful of crossing into government-held territory, while, at the same time, the Tigers used intimidation and coercion to hold onto civilians even as the LTTE-controlled areas shrunk to a narrow coastal spit of sand Weiss, Colombo announced the first NFZ as part of its purported zero-civilian casualty policy in January , shortly after the Tigers began retreating eastward from Kilinochchi. Though the ICRC and doctors in the Vanni reported on the deteriorating situation, Colombo invariably challenged the validity of such reports, denying access to independent journalists and framing calls to curb the fighting as evidence of pro-Tiger and pro-terror sympathies Perera, They had access to satellite imagery, a constant stream of information from medical personnel and other individuals in the warzone, and the eyewitness account of a combat-experienced UN international security staff member, Harun Khan.

He made numerous calls to SLA headquarters to demand a halt to the barrage, but to little effect Weiss, Following M. It soon concluded that the majority of casualties were the result of government fire IRP, By the end of January, the humanitarian, human rights, and politics arms of UN were engaged in an increasingly vocal behind-the-scenes campaign against the attacks on civilians.

There also appears to have been a poor understanding of the essence of humanitarian action, particularly in relation to non-material needs.Related Papers.

One only has to look at the economic crisis that followed the terrorist attacks against the United States, or the extensive security measures put in place after those same attacks. Colombo announced the first NFZ as part of its purported zero-civilian casualty policy in January , shortly after the Tigers began retreating eastward from Kilinochchi.

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